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criticism. Chapters v, ix, and x fall more within the field of jurisprudence itself. They
deal with such topics as "The Command Theory and Its Rivals," "Legal Sovereign and
Political Sovereign," and "Some Legal Concepts," and contain, amongst other good
things, an extremely clear exposition and refutation of the social contract theory.
Here again abstractness is mitigated by reference (a) to specific authorities such as
Austin, Vinogradoff, Sir E. Barker, and many others, and (b) to apposite concrete
instances.
The author's standpoint is empirical, comparative, and historical. He excludes from
jurisprudence (as far as possible for one himself living in a historical period) the encroachment of value-judgments from the fields of ethics and social and speculative
philosophy, and would make of jurisprudence a dispassionate scientific study of
phenomena which are actual rather than ideal. He warns that a good deal of what he
says is regarded as heterodox, but claims that the points of view suggested are worth
further consideration.
The book is exceptionally well written, and suggests the easy mastery of a welltrained legal mind on the bench. The reviewer can find no fault with the clearness,
soundness, and indeed finality of the author's summing up. But the reader, on laying
the book down after enjoying it, is inclined to wonder whether the ex cathedrafinality,
which is so impressive in its reference to history which is past, is not perhaps out of
place when it refers to a history which is still in the making. The feeling persists that
present-day writers (e.g., Mr. Harold L aski) -who are tried and found wanting as authorities in the field of theory, may actually have more to do with the creation, by
legislation, of the brave new world of the future than the author's analyses, however
logically brilliant, indicate.
RuPERT C. LODGE*

Transportation under Two Masters. By Charles D. Drayton. Washington: The National Law Book Co., 1946. Pp. 375.
Except for personal attacks on the author of Justice in Transportationand on Judge
Thurman Arnold, who contributed the introduction to that book, Mr. Drayton, in
Transportation under Two Masters, merely repeats the ancient arguments of railroad propagandists who have contended that the railroads, because they are subject to
regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, should be exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws. Mr. Drayton considers the enforcement of the antitrust laws by
the Department of Justice a molestation or interference with the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and an attempt to "take out of the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission a large measure of authority vested in that body." Mr.
Drayton inquires whether the public interest would be served by the "continuance of
orderly regulation of our transportation system by the Interstate Commerce Commission" or whether that tribunal should be "superseded in its regulatory function by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice."' The assumption that regulated
carriers cannot simultaneously be required to obey these two laws enacted by the
Congress is the basic fallacy of his book.
Mr. Drayton would have the reader believe that the Sherman Antitrust Act was
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never intended to be applied to transportation and that when the Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion in the Trans-Missourizand Joint Traffic Association'
cases, it committed a grievous error. He further asserts that because conditions today
are different from those prevailing when the above cases were decided, the Sherman
Act is no longer applicable to transportation companies. This is the burden of chapters
ii and iii, wherein he restates the time-worn arguments of railroad lawyers in the two
above-mentioned cases and the more current arguments of railroad lawyers in the
pending antitrust suits, United States v. Association of American Railroads,4 and
Georgiav.PennsylvaniaRailroad.sAnd in this connection members of the bar will be
startled to learn that in Mr. Drayton's opinion the inaction of one House of Congress
is sufficient to repeal a duly enacted statute! He reasons that because the Senate, in
receiving a report made by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to a Senate
Resolution authorizing an investigation of the Transcontinental Freight Bureau, took
no further action, "this fact would seem to constitute a clear legislative recognition"
that the operation of rate conferences, such as that described in the commission's report, did not constitute a restraint of trade or commerce.7 Mr. Drayton conveniently
overlooks the repeated refusals of Congress to enact legislation exempting such conferences from the antitrust laws.8
Notwithstanding this position, Mr. Drayton further on welcomes, indeed advocates, explicit legislative relief from the antitrust laws and hopefully predicts the passage of the Bulwinkle bill9 designed to achieve that end."' Evincing further doubt as
to the soundness of his interpretation of existing law, Mr. Drayton makes the startling
pronouncement that " ....ifthe Supreme Court should under present conditions
outlaw such [rate] conferences and actually bring them to an end it would result in
chaos and there would arise such a hurricane of public indignation and protest as to
inevitably sweep aside any such decision." ' This is hardly a restrained statement from
a member of the bar.
At this point, it becomes necessary to test Mr. Drayton's basic assumption in the
light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, a process he studiously avoids. On
2 United

States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, i66 U.S. 290 (1897).
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, i71 U.S. 505 (i898).
4 Civil Action No. 246, U.S. District Court for District of Nebraska, Lincoln Division.
sOriginal No. ii, in the Supreme Court of the United States. This is the substantive case,
not to be confused with the hearing on jurisdiction reported as Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
6S.R. x94, 67 th Cong. 2d Sess., passed Dec. i, 1921.
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7Pp. 51-52.
8First refusal, see 21 Cong. Rec. 4099, 4753, 5950, 5981, 62o8, 6314 (I8go); second refusal,
see i Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 52 (i93i); third refusal, see Hearings
before House Committee on Judiciary on Trust Legislation, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. 2, at
1894 (1914), 51 Cong. Rec. 9582, 9285, 9286 (i914); S.Rep. 698, 63 d Cong. 2d Sess., 46, 6o
('9x4); 5 Cong. Rec. 14028, 16264, 16344 (1914); fourth refusal, see Hearings before Senate
Committee on S.942, Regulation of Rate Bureaus, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (19 43). The Bulwinkle
bill (H. R. 2536, 79 th Cong., ist Sess., 1946), now pending in Congress, is the fifth
attempt to
set aside the antitrust laws as applied to rate-making in transportation.
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March 26, 1945, the Supreme Court in the Georgia case 2 reaffirmed its former holdings
that carriers are subject to the antitrust laws and that, notwithstanding the provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act, "conspiracies among carriers to fix rates were included in the broad sweep of the Sherman Act." Further, the Court saw no conflict
between those two acts of Congress. Indeed, the Court made it clear that the operation
of the antitrust laws in the transportation field does not retard, hamper, or supersede
regulatory processes, as Mr. Drayton would have the reader believe, but is definitely in
aid thereof.
In thus expounding the meaning and purpoie of the Sherman Act, as applied to
transportation, the Court noted that there is an area of lawful collaboration among
carriers in the making of joint rates. The Court said: "It is pointed out, however, that
under § 1(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act .... it is 'the duty of every common
carrier subject to this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable
request therefor, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers,
and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto.'
And it is noted that agreement among carriers is provided in the establishment of joint
rates. § 6. That is true. But it would be a perversion of those sections to hold that they
legalize a rate-fixing combination of the character alleged to exist here. The collaboration contemplated in the fixing of through and joint rates is of a restrictive nature.
We do not stop at this stage of the proceedings to delineate the legitimate area in
which that collaboration may operate ..... ' 3
Ignoring the Court's clear statement that there is a legitimate function for rate conferences within an area of lawful collaboration (a study of which would have been a
real service), Mr. Drayton chooses to concentrate on fictitious issues, such as charging
that the Department of Justice favors cutthroat competition or complete abolition of
rate conferences, including those which are legitimate. An examination of the Supreme
Court's decision shows that it has not struck down all rate conferences. They may be
established by the carriers for legitimate purposes. Thus, it appears that there will
be no "chaos" and no consequent need for creating a "hurricane" to sweep the Supreme
Court from its high esteem in the hearts and minds of the American people.
What is the great issue here involved? Is it cutthroat competition versus regulated
monopoly, as Mr. Drayton would have the readers believe? I do not think so. I believe
that the overriding issue is whether private companies operating public transportation
systems are to continue as pawns employed to perpetuate economic and financial power
in the hands of a few powerful banking and business houses, or whether these transportation companies are to be operated by railroad owners and managers as private enterprises within the regulatory scheme established by Congress. Mr. Drayton completely
submerges this great issue. There is only a slighting reference thereto on page 68 of his
book. But this is the heart of the antitrust suits brought by the Government and by the
State of Georgia, both of which receive cavalier treatment at the hands of Mr. Drayton.
Let us first consider the Government's antitrust suit. In this suit, the Government
seeks to free the West and the nation from the domination of the traditional railroad
bankers, J. P. Morgan and Company and Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and businessmen of related interests, which has been made possible through their control of our bas12 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945),
' Ibid., at 457.
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ic industry, transportation. Such control enables these banking and business interests
to dominate substantially every industrial and commercial activity, since the character
and cost of available transportation determine the life of communities and of whole
states, permitting one industry to flourish and condemning another to decay, stimulating the development of somie resources and leaving others untouched. The Government charges that this monopolistic control of transportation by a group primarily
concerned with protecting industries and investments in the East, has been used to
suppress the industrial development of the West, thereby hindering the growth of
population in the West and curtailing its purchasing power. And by it all, the complaint charges, the conspirators have depressed the national economy. In broad outline, the state of Georgia's original suit in the Supreme Court charges a like conspiracy
to hold the economy of Georgia and the South in a state of arrested development.
Involved in both of these suits are the activities of the Association of American
Railroads, an organization which the Government charges J. P. Morgan and Company, or its predecessor, helped to form. One may search Mr. Drayton's book in vain
for any condemnation of this gigantic conspiracy which responsible federal and state
officials charge in the courts of the land against those who are the traditional rulers of
our transportation systems."4
Mr. Drayton scorns the competitive ideal in transportation, for, he states, "Regulation is the antithesis of competition." He can find no support for this view in the decided cases, nor can he find support from those who truly believe in private enterprise
in transportation. A few years ago, a man entered the railroad field with a determination that, at least so far as the system he represented was concerned, it should be freed
from the monopolistic control of traditional railroad bankers. This man was Robert R.
Young. Mr. Young and his associates, working with independent banking houses, determined to bring about competitive bidding in railroad securities. Their long fight was
brought to a successful conclusion in :1944. The railroads, security holders, and the
public have already been saved hundreds of millions of dollars through competitive
bidding.s This group acted in other ways to advance competition in the railroad industry.x6
The point is that there is at least one great force in the railroad field and a great
force in the banking field that believes in the competitive ideal in transportation-an
ideal that may yet save that basic industry for private enterprise.
Mr. Drayton treads on dangerous ground when he challenges the patriotism of those
who do not agreewith him. In the chapter entitled "Giving Aid and Comfort to Our
Enemies," which, he indicates in a footnote, constitutes treason against the United
States, Mr. Drayton refers to a paragraph which the author of Justicein Transportalion quoted from the report of the Truman Committee. Upon the basis of having
quoted this paragraph Mr. Drayton builds his inferences, without being deterred by
'14It is not inappropriate to add that Governor Arnall of Georgia recently testified before the
Senate Interstate Commerce Committee that he brought the Georgia suit with the encouragement of President Roosevelt.
ZsHearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1253, Modification of
Railroad Financial Structures, 7 9th Cong. 2d Sess., at 318-320 (1946).
x6 Ibid.,

at 321-23.

BOOK REVIEWS
the fact that he is charging the President of the United States (who while vice president indorsed Justice in Transportation)with treason. I am less impressed than is Mr.
Drayton with the patriotism of the monopolists in transportation. Five men, four of
whom were taken from the rate-fixing conferences of the organized railroad industry,
placed in uniform, and given the rank of major, were given the "duty" to agree upon
the rates charged by the War Department by the railroads of the nation. The rates
charged the War Department by the railroads during the war have been the subject
of a recent investigation by a three-man committee of experts appointed by the executive office of the President, Bureau of the Budget. Its report has been submitted to the
Department of Justice and to Congress for action. This report discloses that "the
Government has not only paid excessive charges in a stupendous amount before and
since Pearl Harbor, but it is still paying such excessive charges on presently moving
traffic and will continue to pay them until appropriate action is taken to remedy this
situation." The means and methods employed by the Association of American Railroads to further this far-from-patriotic situation were brought to light, at least in part,
by testimony of Department of Justice representatives at current hearings of the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce.
Mr. Drayton's assertion that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
sabotaged the war effort needs no defense at my hands. When the President established the Office of Defense Transportation, Attorney General Francis Biddle and Mr.
Joseph B. Eastman agreed on an arrangement whereby carriers, upon receiving authority from that agency and theDepartment, might pool their services and facilities in the
interest of the war effort. Mr. Eastman expressed the view that if such procedure had
been available in World War I, it would not have been necessary for the Government
then to take over the railroads. In the light of this fact it is preposterous for Mr. Drayton to assert that government ownership of all transportation agencies is the end now
secretly sought by the Department of Justice.
The introduction by Luther M. Walter deserves comment because of the statement
therein that .... there is no longer any need for the application of the principles of the
Sherman Act to preterve competition among railroads." Mr. Walter, as trustee of the
Chicago Great Western Railway Company and as a lawyer, has repeatedly appealed
to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to enforce the Sherman Act
against the railroads. A notable instance was the antitrust proceeding resulting in a
consent decree prohibiting the railroads of the United States from giving effect to an
agreement whereby the Association of American Railroads forbade coordination of
railroad and motor carriers. Ekeu, quantum mutatus ab illo.
Mr. Drayton has missed a great opportunity to make a constructive case, if one can
be made, for regulated monopoly in transportation against the concept advanced in
Justice in Transportation of competition within the framework of regulatory laws.
Instead he has chosen to offer the reader a hodge-podge of time-worn arguments, assertions, and inaccuracies, interlarded with invective. Much of the material can be found
in a pamphlet written in 1945 by C. E. Johnston, Chairman, Western Association of
Railway Executives, styled Two Masters?
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